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ABSTRACT
Modern security operations centers (SOCs) employ a variety
of tools for intrusion detection, prevention, and widespread
log aggregation and analysis. While research efforts are
quickly proposing novel algorithms and technologies for cy-
ber security, access to actual security personnel, their data,
and their problems are necessarily limited by security con-
cerns and time constraints. To help bridge the gap between
researchers and security centers, this paper reports results
of semi-structured interviews of 13 professionals from five
different SOCs including at least one large academic, re-
search, and government organization. The interviews fo-
cused on the current practices and future desires of SOC op-
erators about host-based data collection capabilities, what
is learned from the data, what tools are used, and how tools
are evaluated. Questions and the responses are organized
and reported by topic. Then broader themes are discussed.
Forest-level takeaways from the interviews center on prob-
lems stemming from size of data, correlation of heteroge-
neous but related data sources, signal-to-noise ratio of data,
and analysts’ time.
Keywords: user study, security operations, host-based
data, security tools
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Networked computing assets have become integral tools for
personal, business, and state functions, and most enterprises
rely on an operational team of security experts working reg-
ularly to ensure networks are healthy and secure. Modern
cyber security operations now have a diverse collection of
tools for monitoring devices and behaviors, blocking intru-
sions, alerting on known problems, and logging a large and
increasing set of data. In parallel, research efforts, especially
in data science and related fields, are proposing and testing
new algorithms, technologies, and interfaces to address in-
formation security needs. Yet, the two communities—cyber
security operations and researchers—inevitably develop sep-
arately. Researchers often do not have regular interaction
with operators, and cyber operations are generally sensitive
about sharing information to limit their vulnerabilities.
To bridge this gap, we have interviewed security analysts
to learn more about security operations work practices and
tools. Our focus was on how operations use host-based
data. This is for a number of reasons. First, host data
can give much greater insight into workstations and servers
than network data. Second, increasingly network data is
encrypted forcing security operators to rely on host-based
security. Third, the amount of data collected and processed
by cyber operations is large and increasing, so continuing to
distribute the burden to nodes is a promising avenue for ex-
panding security measures. Finally, we foresee an increase
in the utilization of cloud resources, where monitoring is
possible from both the hypervisor and inside the host but
network monitoring is not possible. The research presented
here complements our work to survey the research literature
on host-based intrusion detection [10].
In this paper we provide an overview of related studies of
security operations (Section 2), discuss our methodology in
Section 3, then present the interview questions and sum-
marize and report findings from operators’ responses from
Section 4. Finally we illustrate broader conclusions and in-
sights in Sections 5 and 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
User studies to understand the interplay of sociology and
technology with respect to security is an active area of re-
search, especially in the Usenix community, e.g., [16, 17].
Here we give a brief survey of those related works, defined
as user studies to understand SOC operations. Compared
to research proposing novel algorithms and tools for SOC
operations, e.g., [1,3,5,6,10,12–15], there are relatively few
works engaging the actual security workers to inform these
efforts.
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Early research of Goodall et al. [11] focuses on intrusion
detection tasks conducting contextual interviews in situ with
nine security analysts. The authors describe a generalized
procedure, i.e. the steps analysts follow for handling alerts
from monitoring to incident analysis to response. Primary
findings are that domain expertise (understanding attacks,
protocols, etc.) are needed in addition to tacit, network-
specific knowledge and that challenge of contextualization
by manually integrating data from multiple sources is noted.
Two primary suggestions based on the research findings are
proposed by this work: (1) a tiered structure to SOC analyst
roles and (2) visualization tools to gain efficiency in each
portion of the process.
Fink et al. [8,9] conduct semi-structured interviews with 20
security workers focusing on the manual process to men-
tally correlate network- and host-level data. The work de-
scribes a new technological solution to address the problem,
HoNe (Host-Network Visualizer) that correlates host pro-
cesses with corresponding ports in an intuitive visualization.
Fourteen security professionals from five organizations par-
ticipated in a semi-structured interviewed study by Botta et
al. [4], who seek information about the roles, responsibilities,
tasks and skills of SOC employees. Their findings are that
the most important skills of security analysts are pattern
recognition, inference, and “bricolage”, the ability to build a
story from diverse ingredients. They also provide a table of
tasks mapped to corresponding tools.
Werlinger et al. [20] conduct 36 semi-structured interviews
with security management and professionals from 17 or-
ganizations with the goal of itemizing and understanding
relationships between challenges faced by security experts.
Many of the 17 challenges Werlinger et al. identifies are
supported by our work, especially, lack of training, lack of
budget, priority of security within the organization, man-
agement, vulnerabilities, and lack of effective tools.
Follow-on work by an overlapping set of authors, Werlinger
et al. [21] interview 16 practitioners with an eye on incident
response practices reaching similar conclusions to Goodall et
al. [11]—that tacit environmental knowledge was key. They
also discuss the collaborative nature of the work requiring
discovery of what happened from tools/data well enough to
articulate it to other parties.
Bauer et al. [2] focus on access-control management, inter-
viewing 13 operators with expertise in access control of data
systems or physical space. They cite disconnections between
capabilities and policy and between policy makers and im-
plementers as the primary hurdles in the space.
A limitation of the works above, as well as the work in this
paper, is the small sample size that may limit the gener-
alizability of the results. This is a product of the security
operations’ default to not discuss details with external or
untrusted parties as well as their work volume. De Souza et
al. [7] avoid this limitation by supplementing a qualitative
study of 20 semi-structured interviews with a quantitative
study, delivering an electronic, 45-question survey and re-
ceiving over 200 respondents. De Souza et al. focus on
the information needs of the system administrators, and the
study was conducted on a particular “Big Service Factor”
(BSF) that provides IT (information technology) services
to many client enterprises; i.e., they study IT security pro-
fessionals that are outsourced, rather than IT staff working
exclusively internal to the networks they protect. In parallel
to findings of Goodall et al. [11] and Werlinger et al. [21],
De Souza et al. reconfirm that network-specific knowledge
is a key skill. De Souza et al. conclude that interaction with
the customer and knowledge of the customer’s network are
the key components for BSF security personnel.
Sundaramurthy et al. [19] employ anthropological methods
to study SOCs by shadowing and working in the specific
roles at the SOCs they study. This gives unique perspectives
from which to build tools. Their findings focus on conflicts
of interest, or “contradictions” created by the environment,
job, management, and tools. For example, analysts describe
being driven by continually learning to keep up with evolv-
ing threats, yet have ongoing pressure to prove their worth
to management through metrics, reports, etc. Many of the
contradictions mirror our findings and are noted below when
discussed in our our results. Sundaramurthy et al. also de-
scribe a tool that was fielded at a SOC because it automated
repetitive tasks, but their studies found that without contin-
ual development to evolve the tool with the operation, it was
quickly abandoned. This unique study provides a variety of
challenges imposed on the security professionals as well as
actual experience of challenges for researchers attempting to
develop adopted tools.
To our knowledge this is the only work that interviews SOC
operators to empirically study how they use and evaluate
host-based data and related tools.
3. METHODOLOGY & PARTICIPANTS
Our interview consisted of 25 questions, with one question
on the interviewee’s professional role/title and the remaining
24 broken into categories/sections of this paper as follows:
• Questions on host-based data, Section 4.1: These ques-
tions probe what and how much data operations collect
and how it is stored and finally what data is desired by
the participants.
• Questions on tools, Section 4.2: This section reports the
commercial tools adopted by operations, their turnover,
and how internal tool development occurs.
• Dynamic collection capabilities, Section 4.3: This section
covers questions pertaining to just-in-time or otherwise
automated changes to data collection to enhance security
in certain circumstances.
• Learning from host-based data, Section 4.4: These ques-
tions ask what information is desired/obtained from the
data collected.
• Evaluation of Tools, Section 4.5: In this section we report
on how operations evaluate the security tools used, and
specifically probe how analysts’ time and end-user costs
are take into account.
We interviewed 13 respondents from five distinct organiza-
tions including at least one academic, one government, and
one large research institution. Some respondents made clear
that their organization did not own the hosts on their net-
work, which limits their host-based control and data col-
lection capabilities and incentivizes network-based means.
Conversely, other participants worked for organizations that
did own their hosts facilitating enterprise-wide, host-based
security measures. Of the 13 participants, five responded
with a role of Security Analyst or equivalent, three were Se-
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nior Security Analysts, one was a Chief of Host Forensics &
Incident Response, one was a SOC manager, one was a man-
ager of both a NOC and SOC, one was a Network Engineer,
and one was the Client Services Team Lead.
The interviews were semi-structured, following the set ques-
tions, but allowing analysts to digress. Interviewers recorded
answers for future analysis. The interviews were conducted
one-on-one, five over the phone and the remaining eight in
person with duration of approximately an hour on average.
We follow standard qualitative research methods [18]—read-
ing responses and letting themes surface while trying to be
unbiased, objective, and not presuppose a result. We note
that some amount of technical “pre-knowledge” in cyber se-
curity is required to understand the domain and interact
with participants; so while we did not enter the coding phase
with themes in mind, we did have a working understand-
ing of the domain of cyber security. More specifically, our
workflow for coding results was to shuffle responses, read all
responses for a set of related questions, then report on our
findings. For questions requiring quantifiable or categorical
responses, we report aggregate statistics. When more open-
ended responses were common, we highlight representative
responses and attempt to accurately summarize the findings.
Care was given to report useful results while not disclos-
ing details of any organization or person. Finally, vendor-
specific details, when encountered have been anonymized.
Our experience is that a relationship of trust in our research
team by someone at the institution was seemingly a require-
ment for anyone to agree to an interview. We suspect that
this is in part the nature of security operation centers—to
be reluctant to share information about themselves with un-
trusted parties and to protect their time. It was clear from
all interviews that the operators are extremely busy, and
their time is very valuable—a theme also borne out in the
needs and desires for analytic tools.
4. QUESTIONS & RESULTS
Our interview questions were organized into groups related
to: host data collection, tools used in operations, dynamic
data collection, learning from data, and how tools are eval-
uated. This section presents each of the interview questions
and reports the results for each.
4.1 Host Data Collection Questions
The first section of the interview dealt with the collection,
size, and storage of host-based data, as well a discussion of
data analysts do not currently collect that could be helpful.
Questions 1 & 2: What host-based data do you collect?
Are there any special data collection methods for virtual
hosts?: All interviewees’ organizations included host-based
anti-virus (AV) tools and many reported collecting logs of
alerts from these tools by default. Low-quantity logging was
expressed by employees of a few organizations, e.g., only
performing periodic scans to identify if personally identifi-
able information (PII) was stored on workstations, logging
failed authentications, and collecting host-based AV logs.
These institutions often also collected more thorough logs
from servers.
Many organizations had ample collection capabilities and by
default store a wide variety of host event logs. Logs from
end-point AV, authorizations, system and accesses, security
system alerts, Windows Registries, DLLs, VPN (virtual pri-
vate network) remote connections, and vulnerability scans
are examples mentioned. This capability varied widely (a)
for servers versus workstations with more logs collected from
servers in general and (b) across operating systems (OSes)
with more logs for Windows workstations than Linux and
Mac OSes. It was not uncommon for these event logs to be
collected for all workstations and servers by default, while
others mentioned it was too costly for all workstations. Some
organizations collect virtual private network logs, e.g., IPs,
MAC addresses, authentication information. Scanners that
report if PII occur on host data are used. Email information
and user information is commonly available to the SOC for
each workstation. Management systems that enforce poli-
cies and allow automated configuration of data collection
settings on the corresponding host clients are used. No op-
erators reported augmented data collection for virtual hosts
on their network. Often the ability to actively obtain cur-
rent host data (e.g., hard drive (HD) images) that is not
passively collected was communicated.
Question 3: How big is it?: Reported size of host data var-
ied widely among those that responded to this question. On
the low end an approximation of 300MB/day were given.
One respondent works across many organizations and re-
ported 100GB to 10TB per day, with the latter the largest
estimate given during our interviews.
Question 4: How long do you store it for analysis?: Com-
mercial event logging and management subscription costs
were cited directly by some as the constraint for data col-
lection after mentioning they would benefit from more data
collection. Perhaps this is unsurprising given estimates from
the numbers above—the sheer quantity of host data col-
lected and available to security operator centers is between
1GB-1TB/day, stored for 3 months≈ 100days = 100GB-
100TB.
Some participants mentioned open-source logging and man-
agement software. Specifically, a few said both commercial
and open-source solutions were in use, to either save costs,
or test and potentially transition to a new solution.
For storage duration, three to six months was standard.
Many reported using or having future plans of a three-tiered
scheme—moving data from the initial database after three
to six months to a less queriable but cheaper storage mode
for two years, and finally to tape (presumably cheaper and
less liquid) for six years or “indefinitely”. Forward leaning
operation centers are targeting a data-dependent pyramid
scheme to cut costs and increase efficiency of queries.
Question 5: What host-based data is not currently used for
detection that you think could be really beneficial for detec-
tion?: To our question on desired host-data collection capa-
bilities we received many diverse responses illustrating the
current limitations (or lack thereof) and uses of host data.
Two respondents indicated their current host-data collec-
tions were sufficient, while others desired capabilities to col-
lect more data from hosts, in particular application-level au-
dit logs. Greater logging of host activities on non-Windows
machines was requested.
Two participants indicated a desire for tools allowing visibil-
ity of packets before encryption and transmission. Interest-
ingly, one participant requested something akin to a remote
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desktop recording allowing analysts to see what the user was
clicking/typing at the time of a past incident. Unsurpris-
ingly, increasingly used encrypted traffic is forcing analysts
to leverage host-data and require novel tools to balance se-
curity with privacy. This is also articulated by Hossain et
al. [13].
Multiple respondents asked for contextual integration of
data. One requested automated matching of file hashes to
corresponding processes and two others sought correlations
related to the host’s ports, including which are listening,
in use, and correlating ports to the processes using them.
Perhaps non-coincidentally, interviews of Fink et al. [8,9] of
security analysts identified exactly this problem—generally,
related but heterogeneous data from different systems must
be held in the analysts mind and manually correlated, and,
specifically, process information (host level) is problemati-
cally manually correlated with corresponding ports, packet
transfer, etc. (network information) by analysts. Fink et
al. [8] introduces HoNe, a visual analytic tool to address
correlating heterogeneous but related logging data for cy-
ber analysts. This illustrates the gap between research-
developed cyber tools and those adopted by analysts or
through industry-licensed products.
While most operators collect end-point AV logs from work-
stations, analysts requested a technology that furnishes priv-
ilege escalation notifications to the user. They explained
that they regard the user as the authority on what should
happen on their platform.
4.2 Tools Questions
This section summarizes responses to questions probing
what tools are used by operations for host-based data col-
lection. Additionally, we asked how new tools or data feeds
are integrated. We included questions on what and how in-
house, situational, or one-off developments of code or tools
take place, in hopes of stimulating discussions of how new
tools are developed. Finally, we asked analysts to identify
their oldest, newest, and most critical tools.
Question 6: What detection products are used at the host
level?: Answers to this question were aggregated by type
to anonymize the vendor or product specifics and are pre-
sented in Figure 1. We note that some tools, may experience
low frequency because whether they count as “host level” is
debatable, e.g., ticketing systems.
Question 7: Can you describe tools or code developed in-
house for detection or investigation?: While many respon-
dents reported no custom tools were in place, others reported
a surprisingly robust set of hand-crafted tools. The reported
custom tools are as follows:
• Python, bash, and shell scripts for blocking, filtering based
on regular expressions, and parsing;
• Work to develop signatures and perform dynamic malware
analysis tools (i.e., tools for analyzing malware while run-
ning in a virtual environment);
• Scripts for identifying port scanning and reverse-DNS
queries that block detected traffic at the firewall;
• Code to identify then log and block password brute-force
attempts;
• Configuring dashboards with SIEM tools for monitoring
authentication data and other data of interest;
Figure 1: Bar chart depicts participants responses to “What
detection products are used at the host level?”. Responses are
binned by category.
• Vulnerability management tools, which correlate informa-
tion from many other systems;
• Client services that perform work on the host, then report
results;
• PII-identifying scanners were crafted but have now been
replaced by [a commercially available tool];
• Unix Logging Service (ULS), i.e., a Unix analogue for col-
lecting Windows event logs that allows configurable log
forwarding from Unix-based hosts to the operation cen-
ter;
• Network flow visualizations by port;
• Customized [end-point configuration management tool]
scripts for stopping malware propagation that AV cannot
detect.
Finally, some analysts have piloting and adopted tools from
professional research projects.
Question 8: Can you discuss the process for deciding to inte-
grate new data feeds or security tools (especially host-based
detection tools)?: Responses showed a similar workflow
from most participants’ organizations, although criteria in
each step varied.
Motivations for considering on-boarding new tools or feeds
varied from technological advances, ending life-cycle of cur-
rent tools, changes in policy or law, to appease manage-
ment, or to fulfill needs identified by analysts. Most dis-
cussed a period of investigating what tools/feeds were avail-
able in comparison to what is currently in use with mul-
tiple respondents emphasizing complementary tools. One
analyst consulted a visualization created to display the pre-
sent tools and feeds. Another mentioned new tools must
be “disruptive or novel” to be adopted. Overall, this phases
of decision-making seemed to focus on whether the desired
tool complemented current tools, met a need, and produced
understandable output; furthermore, it was often a result of
managerial- or policy-prescribed changes.
The next phase of the process described by most respon-
dents involved some evaluation of the tools ease-of-use
and security posture itself. Some consulted a list of ap-
proved/unapproved objects, or looked for how well-adopted
the tools is. Others mentioned the usefulness of the output
was a large factor; specifically, coarse, untrusted, and/or
not-understandable output (e.g., a red/yellow/green secu-
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rity rating) was commonplace but not helpful, and overly
abundant although precise information (e.g., a multi-page,
detailed vulnerability report) was similarly not useful. An-
alysts’ time was a large factor, citing a tools ease of install,
configuration, and use as deciding factors. In particular,
one participant mentioned the default was to purchase in-
stall/configuration services from the vendor alongside the
product/license. We (the authors) investigated the issue of
install and configuration support for six commercially avail-
able security products, all of whom now provide seemingly
ample (e.g., 160 man hours) initial support.
Other concerns voiced were security vulnerabilities imposed
by the tool under consideration, e.g., if the tool requires
high user privileges to run. This respondent operated under
the assumption that “vendors do not [penetration] test their
own tools”.
One analyst explained that testing tools in advance is worth-
while to reveal that they are slow regardless of the resources
of that particular machine. In general, cloud-based tools are
“not responsive”.
The third stage of evaluation of new tools/feeds involved
hands-on interaction. One analyst mentioned his organiza-
tion has a “bake off” to test similar tools head to head be-
fore deciding, while others discussed at least a trial period
of a tool. One organization has a tier schema for testing
such tools with SOC testing them first, IT (NOC) second,
and then a cost-to-user evaluation (presumably based on the
performance in the tests).
Finally, two respondents mentioned upon final decision to
introduce a new tool/feed, a plan is implemented to roll out
the tool to different user groups in phases.
Questions 9, 10: Can you describe how/when you write one-
off code for detection or investigation, and how do one-off
efforts develop into new detection or investigation tools?:
Four respondents said this practice either never happened
or was very rare. Another said it is commonplace when-
ever something is found in the wild that poses a threat to
more than a single host. Examples included writing detec-
tion scripts for malware that was spreading but undetected
by their standard host AV. Other examples provided by
respondents included augmenting configuration of current
tools, e.g., developing and pushing new signatures to an in-
trusion detection/prevention system (IDS/IPS), developing
new queries in log management software to be used for spe-
cific investigations, and customizing host configurations via
one-off scripts. Other examples included pre-patching vul-
nerabilities manually, developing Python scripts to analyze
encrypted packets, and searching host files through scans or
specific disk images.
The majority of participants declined response to how the
single-instance tools develop into customized tools. One
pointed out that this is rare simply because one-off code is by
definition for a very specific instance. Two mentioned that
the inadequacy of their custom tools prompted purchase of
commercial versions, specifically citing log management and
query tools and PII scanning tools as examples. Others
pointed out that most one-off code is built on or leverages
their existing tool suite. As such it becomes adopted through
configuration changes. For those that responded positively,
they pointed to continual development driven by need until
it was production quality. A few mentioned handing ideas
to professional researchers and iterating with the researchers
with suggestions and evaluations during development stages.
Figure 2: Bar chart depicts participants responses to “What tool
is the oldest? Newest? Most critical?”. Responses are binned by
category. Network Scanning category includes tools that identify
assets, vulnerabilities, or data on the network, e.g., Nessus. Host
Logging category refers to configuration software for what system
logs are collected. The Analyst category refers to the security
personnel themselves.
Question 11: What is your oldest detection tool? newest?
most critical?: Finally, we asked analysts to name their
oldest, newest, and most critical security tools. Results are
displayed in Figure 2. Host AV and network-level IDS/IPS
were the top scoring most critical tools. Interestingly, Host
AV is the highest scoring in all categories, indicating it is ex-
periencing high turnover, but has been a mainstay for secu-
rity. We note that many analysts without prompting replied
“The Analyst” to these questions, referring to the actual se-
curity worker. Log Aggregation & Query tools, e.g., Splunk,
were a commonly cited new tool indicating that some opera-
tions are only recently adopting software to collect and man-
age their logs. We note that network flow anomaly detection
systems are becoming adopted.
4.3 Dynamic Collection Questions
Anticipating that the quantity and the signal-to-noise ratio
of data collected in operations are problematic, we hypothe-
sized that operations may have or desire just-in-time security
tools. That is, automated changes to the level of monitoring
to maximize the security posture and minimize the cost of
data collection. An example may include triggers to increase
data collection when it seems most necessary, rather than
collecting such large quantities all the time. We included
the following questions on current and desired dynamic col-
lection:
• Do you have the ability to automatically perform dynamic
data collection, e.g., to turn on/off some collection capa-
bility in certain situations?
• Do you have dynamic or just-in-time prevention or inves-
tigation measure that are applied when an intrusion is
detected, and what would you like developed?
• If you had the capability to dynamically collect high-
fidelity data, how would it be most helpful?
Question 12, 13: Do you have the ability to automatically
perform dynamic data collection, e.g., turn on/off some col-
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lection capability in certain situations? & Do you have dy-
namic or just-in-time prevention or investigation measure
that are applied when an intrusion is detected, and what
would you like developed?: Multiple responses were neg-
ative or unsure about current dynamic collection capabili-
ties. On the contrary, many analysts pointed out standard
capabilities, such as, AV quarantining a file, blocking ac-
tions upon a signature firing (e.g., black-/white-listing IPs),
and adjusting parameters in configuration consoles allowing
specification of data collection per user, location, etc. Some
analysts cited abilities to write rules in configuration man-
agement software which conceivable could be used to grab
more fine-grained data upon certain triggers.
Many also mentioned that they had capabilities to collect
extra, high-fidelity data or change settings of hosts in certain
circumstances but the process was partially manual. Specific
examples included using tools to acquire a disk or memory
image of a host under investigation, changing configuration
settings per host at times, shutting down power, and black-
listing executables.
Question 14: If you had the capability to dynamically col-
lect high-fidelity data, how would it be most helpful?: Many
operators generally knew what extra data they would like,
but were unsure of the appropriate trigger for automati-
cally collecting it. Responses included memory dumps, disk
images, and recording user actions at critical times. Au-
tomated network segmentation was requested to strengthen
the security posture dynamically. At the host level down-
load or execution of files were requested triggers for elevated
data captures. Two separate operators described network
level events as desired triggers for such capabilities, men-
tioning white-/black-lists and anomaly detectors. Both re-
quested automatic interrogation of the host to correlate the
file hashes and processes bound to network activities that
triggered an alert.
Operators often cited the need for integration of information
from different tools and event correlation. One operator re-
quested a tool to automatically correlate user and system
data (e.g., user’s ID, email, and organizational role along
with that host’s OS) across multiple internal systems. Mul-
tiple users explained their workflow included manually corre-
lating events across systems to fill out an incident ticket, and
they desired automated population of tickets across different
data logging systems. Specific requests included a ticket gen-
erator that automatically populates alert info along with full
packet captures from a time window surrounding the alert
and, separately, some capability to make correlations across
multiple hosts. One analyst relayed an example—that SQL
attack alerts require him to manually pull and look into
packets to determine if it is a true or false alert, but if the
alerting tool could include the packets with a ticket it would
save four hours a week.
Instead of dynamic, in-depth data collection, one respon-
dent preferred to collect all possible host data and have
a way to “distill” data and prioritize what to store. An-
other believed enough data was collected by his organiza-
tion and the need was better filtering, access, and visualiza-
tion of the data. Worries of dynamic collection capabilities
producing overwhelming quantities of data were expressed.
Multiple participants requested greater accuracy of detec-
tion tools, and voiced concerns of false positives limiting the
effect of any automated tools. More specifically, an operator
requested tools that produced more fine-grained categoriza-
tion of events through integrating with other data streams.
He explained that some tools alert while others both alert
and give a category of the event or malware detected, yet
in both cases the categories are broad requiring analysts to
determine if it is a false positive.
4.4 Learning from Data Questions
This portion of the survey asked the analysts what they are
or desire discovering from their data, and challenges they
face using it.
Questions 15, 16: What information are you discovering
from data generated at the host? What would you like to
discover?: As the answers given often conflated what in-
formation is learned and what is desired, we report both
together noting the clear wishes that are not yet available.
Many answers described a broad set of goals including in-
dicators of compromise, misuse, abuse, and misconfigura-
tions—as one analysts put it, “a narrative of what hap-
pened on the network and [to] dissect what happened”. Oth-
ers seemed focused on data exfiltration stating their goal is
to find what data, by whom (attribution), and the how it
moved (the sequence of events). Specific mappings from
data types to discovery/desired discovery were given: end
point AV scans were reported as host data used to diagnose
the hosts’ health; new hashes and permission changes help
identify suspicious files; running processes, open sockets, and
objects in memory are used to search for suspicious connec-
tions; social security and credit card numbers are identified
to locate hosts housing unauthorized PII; failure reports e.g.,
bluescreen errors, are investigated to identify software bugs
and patterns of failure; authentication errors and privilege
elevations are triggers to investigate unauthorized accesses.
Desires in this vein included mobile device heath monitor-
ing, session locks, powering on/off of hosts, command line
inputs, and file actions such as renaming, copying, moving
commands.
Many responses indicated host data analysis required in-
tegration of information across various sources and over
time with the requests for tools providing general help in
this regard. Specific requests included discovery of “what
application-level logs mean”, and correlation of network
statistics of listening connections with process, port, time,
and the IPs to which they are talking. This goes hand-in-
hand with the problematic signal-to-noise ratio which was
also explicitly identified as a problem. One respondent asked
for tools to filter non-useful data, reduce volume overall, and
focus on important logs. He/she gave specific examples of
desired information, such as, terminal sessions interacting
outside the network (shells that spawn a socket) and pointed
to Microsoft Sysmon as an ideal example—Sysmon allows
configuration to collect a subset of host logs most relevant
to security investigations, e.g., process creations linked to
creator processes/commands, DLLs, disk read/writes, file
hashes, and information related to creation and modifica-
tions to name a few.
4.5 Evaluation of Tools Questions
We suspect that purchase and continued use of a tool fol-
lows a mental, although possibly not explicit calculation—
one must balance a tool’s contribution to security against
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the variety of costs, e.g., imposition to end user, analysts
time for configuration, reconfiguration, and false positive
investigations, and monetary costs. To this end, our final
subset of questions probes how security operations evaluate
their detection and prevention tools, what the costs of se-
curity measures are, and how to reduce costs. We explicitly
ask about how to measure what the costs are to the user’s
workstation and the security operators.
Question 17: How do you measure effectiveness of detection
and prevention capabilities and novel tools?: While one re-
spondent reported evaluation did not apply to his/her job,
the remaining 12 responses can be divided into three overlap-
ping viewpoints on evaluation criteria: (a) accuracy of the
tool, (b) the cost to the security operation, and (c) the cost
to the end user. A second dichotomy was evident as well—
whether tools were evaluated before or during widespread
deployment.
Most commonly, the quantity of false positives commonly
mentioned with two analysts mentioning the balance of true-
to-false positives. Some gave less precise comments such as
“tools are evaluated on whether we can depend on them,”
indicating accuracy of the alerts or data produced is the
criteria. Others mentioned false positive analysis with com-
ments such as“[false/true positives/negatives] are taken into
account” or “are hard to quantify”, suggesting there was no
formal evaluation, but it is in their minds when consider-
ing the worth of a tool. One respondent mentioned false
negatives without prompting—see next question.
Three different analysts brought up the following false-
positive scenario—a tool alerts or indicates a vulnerability in
a host for which the indicated vulnerability is non-existent
or even impossible given the host’s configuration. One went
on to say
90% of the workload of the SOC could be elim-
inated if alerts for machines that don’t have the
needed vulnerabilities were automatically dis-
carded.
- Participant 3
This supports findings of Sundaramurthy et al. [19] who re-
ported that analysts spend ten minutes on average to popu-
late tickets with data and repeat this process over 15 times
per day, reducing a potentially interesting job to a repetitive
mindless task causing burnout.
To perform accuracy evaluations, most respondents alluded
to the quantity of false positives found during actual use.
Specifically, that an ensuing investigation spawned by an
alert lead analysts to find the alert was errant, and many
also said that corroborating results of multiple tools illumi-
nates false positive or negative when discrepancies are pre-
sent. Multiple different respondents remarked that this led
to reconfiguration costs, in particular, re-crafting signatures,
or in some cases working with vendors to patch tools. Mul-
tiple other analysts dove into pre-adoption evaluation mea-
sures including testing tools in a pilot environment, with a
pilot user subgroup, in sandboxes, or performance (inter-
preted as computational cost) tests. One analysts discussed
a mini-research project to test endpoint AV tools head-to-
head before widespread use by setting up virtual environ-
ments, infecting with a collection of malware samples, and
recording accuracy metrics for different tools.
These pilot testing scenarios bled the conversation from ac-
curacy evaluations to cost of the tools to the security opera-
tion. As an example of this, an analyst remarked that while
ElasticSearch and Splunk are used redundantly in their oper-
ation, ElasticSearch is his/her preference because the query
time is much faster, results are more precise, and it is more
user friendly. One respondent outlined a workflow for tool
evaluation pre-purchase as follows:
• Plausibility of deployment is evaluated including the effort
to stand up the technology, quality of documentation, ease
of install, and considerations of opinions of other adoptees;
• A Pre-deployment trial is conducted with a focus on how
much effort is required to obtain actionable information
from the tool;
• Finally, cost of the tool purchase/subscription is consid-
ered.
The theme of analysts-focused costs were reverberated by
others independent of the pre-/post-deployment evaluation
time frame, including mentions of the speed of information
retrieval (this concern was particularly pointed by one ana-
lyst at the tool’s performance while by another at the learn-
ing curve for use of a tool, e.g., having to learn a query
language before use), balancing analysts’ time with versus
without the tool in place, time used to debunk or verify
alerts, time spent on configuration, and time needed by an-
alysts to learn to use the tools.
Although a minority, a few analysts mentioned impact on
the end user, meaning the person working on the endpoint
being protected as a consideration. Most notably, one re-
spondent seemed primarily end-user focused responding that
too much overhead to the host results in the user not actually
using the desired capability. This response also indicated pi-
lot tests with specific end users.
Question 18: Does this include accommodations for for false
negatives? True negatives?: Upon asking, most partic-
ipants agreed that true/false negatives were important to
consider, and their methods for identifying negatives fell into
three categories. First, and foremost, they are found in prac-
tice, and a few mentioned during manual investigations, and
many mentioned through corroboration of multiple tools. A
specific example given was the host AV finding a true posi-
tive that a network-level signature should have but did not
find. Second, a respondent mentioned that anomaly detec-
tion systems are needed for exactly this, which supports the
results of Figure 2 suggesting anomaly detection tools are
becoming adopted. Third and most interestingly, a few ana-
lysts discussed using IOCs (indicators of compromise), which
are intelligence shared among ally organizations on emerging
attacks and their behaviors or mitigations. IOCs give or lead
to new signatures, which multiple analysts said facilitate his-
torical forensic efforts by running the new detectors against
historic data to find false negatives. One analyst discussed a
more in-depth process including creation of a dashboard and
using new intelligence and signatures for both automatic and
manual hunting of threat in the previous 90 days of data. As
before all three of these processes lead to re-configuration of
tools and crafting of novel signatures.
Questions 19, 20: What are strategies to reduce false posi-
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tives and false negatives? Or to reduce the cost/time asso-
ciated with false positives/negatives (e.g., how long it took
to reconfigure/fix issues with a false positive)?: By far
the most frequent response to this question was to manu-
ally reconfigure tools, in particular tuning rules/signatures.
Drivers cited for tweaking tools included internal discoveries
(e.g., false positives), new IOCs, user feedback, and condi-
tioning rules per subnetwork. Interestingly, more automa-
tion for manually tuning rules was requested. Removing
problematic tools was given as a response by two citing in-
accuracies or continually needing reconfiguration as another.
A general strategy of only adopting tools“with a high signal-
to-noise ratio” was expressed. Prioritization was a common
strategy including checking if a system is vulnerable as a
first step of an investigation, using netflow analysis to isolate
problem machines, and providing only summarized data to
analysts for triage before more in-depth investigation. Other
responses including white-/black-listing, writing plug-ins to
fix problems, programatically fixing a tool by working with
the vendor, and “resolving (not fixing) issues, e.g., deleting
problematic files.”
Question 21, 22: How do you measure cost or efficiency
of detection and prevention capabilities and novel tools in
terms of the user’s workstation? What is the current cost
of security tools on the user’s workstation in terms of mem-
ory requirements, processing time, user experience, or other
metrics?: Six of the 13 respondents were unsure or said
this was not applicable although two mentioned that this
was taken into account by management in some opaque
cost-benefit analysis. One analysts remarked that this is
not taken into account as their security measures are non-
negotiable, mandatory for compliance. Three mentioned
performance measurements when testing on agents, specifi-
cally CPU time and memory used. In particular, some host
logging tools also report metrics on their CPU and memory
costs. Two mentioned disk I/O as a metric, and perhaps the
most important for actual use. To quote one respondent,
CPU and memory are not as important as disk
I/O. Spinning disks cannot handle the host-based
data collection client software. Reboot can be 15
minutes and involve too much performance costs.
All that use SSD (steady state disks) can now
accommodate the tools.
- Participant 9
He/she went on to say that older Windows OSes are often
to blame for user complaints of performance (not necessarily
security clients). Specifically, the“enormous conglomeration
of patches” causes disk I/O problems, although newer ver-
sions do not suffer from this problem. This illustrates the
familiarity of problems for the endpoint user that some an-
alysts have necessarily developed.
No respondent gave quantifiable answers to the latter ques-
tion of what the actual cost is in terms of the metrics they
defined. Responses of the actual cost varied from indicating
it was low, e.g. “unsure, but I don’t notice our clients on
my host”, to it could be an issue depending on use with a
potential to crash machines or cause disk failures. Multiple
comments indicated that configuration of tools take into ac-
count host resources, specifically by scheduling taxing events
such as scans or patching for non-work hours, or changing
priorities of the tools’ processes.
Questions 23, 24: How do you measure cost or efficiency of
detection and prevention capabilities and novel tools in terms
of the analyst’s time? What is the current cost of security
tools on the analyst?: Actual dollar costs were common
answers. One analysts gave an interesting formula for tool
evaluation: convert to dollars the human time spent on in-
vestigating false positives and sum this for all false positives
from a given tool. Others cited actual figures, e.g., “enforc-
ing endpoint encryption was roughly a $10M endeavor.”
Unsurprisingly the most common response to this question
was simply quantification of analysts’ time, i.e., the num-
ber of man hours or employees focusing on alert triage and
response. The range of values cited in this category were
between five and nine analysts full time focusing on alerts.
Emphasis is put on creating good workflows to reduce time
per incident.
Other similar metrics were mentioned including number of
alerts, time per alert, number of total tickets, time per ticket,
output of each analyst. Many were quick to note that while
these fairly simple metrics were used they are insufficient
and miss the point. One analysts remarked that counts of
incidents or true positives or rates of dealing with alerts
were perhaps unintuitively a red herring, citing better tools
may result in alerts that require more time or produce fewer
false positives (therefore getting worse scores in some simple
metrics but providing greater security). Similar sentiment
was expressed by others saying,
The goal is empowering the analyst, not measur-
ing time per ticket.
- Participant 5
and
We focus on ease of use and effectiveness of tools.
- Participant 10
and
Time is less important than correct results.
- Participant 1
Consequently, measuring security becomes much more neb-
ulous. As one analyst answered, “the amount of candy an
analyst eats per day.”
In summary, analysts quickly spouted off a variety of met-
rics to evaluate security, followed by backpedaling to make
clear that these metrics do not provide true measurements
of their understanding of an incident nor the effectiveness of
the tools. This parallels what was found by Sundaramurthy
et al. [19]. To quote the authors,
The professional logic of security analysts (sub-
ject) dictates that they constantly improve their
skills and be efficient in detecting and mitigat-
ing security threats. On the other hand, SOCs
are under constant pressure to demonstrate their
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value to the parent organization. This results
in a number of metrics being defined to mea-
sure the performance of SOC analysts. Ulti-
mately, the job of the analysts is skewed very
much towards generating those defined metrics.
This creates a conflict within them. They are
confounded with two non-identical objectives—
doing the right thing versus the required thing.
5. OBSERVED THEMES & INTERESTING
TANGENTIALS
Here we articulate broader takeaways from the responses
that cross-cut the questionnaire sections. A benefit of an
in-person/phone interview as opposed to a written survey
or multiple choice questionnaire is the propensity for partic-
ipants to describe interesting or impactful events that are
tangential to the question at hand. While the above sec-
tions summarized targeted responses of each question, this
section provides worthwhile discourse that did not fit into
the reporting above with the goal of articulating worthwhile
themes.
Handling and Using Data: Quantity of default-collected
host data varies widely among organizations, but large (e.g.,
100GB/day or more) is not uncommon. From an operation
without the resources to collect widespread host logs, an
analyst desired greater collections, while analysts with more
comprehensive host data collections desired tools for under-
standing. We surmise that analysts believe having ample
host data is better than none, but given ample data find it
is hard to convert into usable information. Constraints on
the quantity and usefulness of data are imposed by cost in
terms of hardware, indexing platforms, and analysts’ time
to handle/use the data effectively.
Software for indexing and storing cyber data is seemingly a
universal requirement, but cost is a limiting factor. Open-
source solutions and less-costly commercial solutions are also
being adopted, and many organizations have historic log
storage. While this questionnaire did not inquire directly
about how historic host logs are used, hunting threats with
new intel to find previous false negatives was discussed by
multiple participants.
A common problem borne out of the responses was a gen-
eral lack of event logging capabilities for Unix-based systems
versus Windows and a lack of uniformity across logging data
from different OSes. Another theme was the general avail-
ability of host data that was not default-collected but was
retrievable by the SOC upon command. Specific examples
included the hard drive (HD) images, memory dumps, in-
dividual files. This facilitates in-depth analysis (if data is
retrieved soon after an event) without the burdensome col-
lection of high-fidelity data from all hosts, but does not per-
mit post-incident analysis if host data is not retrieved before
it is lost (e.g., memory dumps).
Less Data More Information, Please: A large and impor-
tant theme (also discussed in one form or another by previ-
ous studies [8,11]) was that ample data collection is accom-
panied by the burden of creating information and action-
able knowledge from it, a currently manual process. The
responses continually revisited the need for data collection
capabilities that would correlate heterogeneous sources of
data to increase the signal and decreasing the noise. To
quote an analyst from our study,
Lots of work has gone into building the collection
[capabilities]. More of the need is correlation and
use of the data [for] faster and more efficient re-
sponse.
- Participant 12
The lack of higher-level actionable information, when work-
ing with data associated with low-level events, was a com-
mon thread in the responses. It appears that a significant
interpretation gap exists; data at the singular event level is
not necessarily sufficient for human understanding or man-
ual response. This was best expressed in the interviews by
a participant who identified a challenge for analysts as,
Turning low-level system events into higher-level
events and user-level actions
- Participant 5
The state-of-the-practice approach to this information ex-
traction leans heavily on human analysis. In the interviews,
the participants used terms like ‘integration’, ‘correlation’,
and ‘anomaly detection’ to express the need for tools and
methods that analyze across the various low-level data, such
that it is quickly interpreted and acted on by a human.
Yet another example was given by a participant discussing
vulnerability scanning tools.
[Vulnerability scanning & management tool A]
was supposed to fix the [Vulnerability scanning &
management tool B] problem—it gives a bunch of
vulnerabilities but not an actionable item. What
do we need to patch? [Vulnerability scanning &
management tool A] isolates the software prod-
uct that is causing the vulnerabilities. It cor-
relates vulnerabilities up the software level so
we know what to patch. But we later found
that [Vulnerability scanning & management tool
A] did not have a wide enough vulnerability
database to compete with [Vulnerability scan-
ning & management tool B].
- Participant 9
One analyst digressed to describe a sequence of large-impact
attacks against his organization spawning management man-
dates for increasing security posture and substantial increase
funding and tools for their SOC. He/she said that even with
the increased funding and tools, the manpower and expertise
needed for adequate forensic and log analysis is too high,
Generally, we need log interrogation and host-
based IDSes that are easier to use and un-
derstand than we currently have. ... The
level of expertise needed for forensics and log
analysis is high. This requires a lot of time
and people power. Things like SysMon [that
produce] a higher signature-to-noise ratio make
thing understandable—off-the-shelf tools for fil-
tering non-useful data. We’d like a capability
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that reduces the volume and focuses on high-
fidelity logs.
- Participant 2
Participant 2 went on to say later in the interview,
Currently cyber operations are like a roach
motel—logs go in but nothing comes out.
and that in addition to more analysts and more expertise,
tools that increase the signal-to-noise ratio will help.
Our takeaway is that analysts foresee next generation tools
in a two step process that (1) filter based on rules or other
analytics to isolate a subset of security-relevant logs and
(2) integrate related logs, not just within a host (e.g. pro-
cess and creator process) but across heterogeneous streams
of data (e.g., the shell commands, the socket, and pack-
ets of the spawned connection along with platform and user
information for the host and only the relevant known vul-
nerabilities.) We note that many efforts have taken on the
research and development task to pioneer tools in this vein;
e.g., HoNe [9], CLIQUE [3], Stucco [1], SANSR [14] and
IDEAS [5] propose visual-analytic tools to this end, while
work of Hossain et al. [13] and ProTracer [15] seek to com-
press logs without inhibiting log analysis.
Analyst Time & Effective Results: These cries for meaning-
ful integration of data sources to help the data-to-decision
process lead the another cross-cutting theme, that the real
goal is protection and correct understanding from the data,
but to achieve this analysts do not have enough time. One
participant remarked that in his/her organization analysts
are given only ten minutes for triaging an alert because of
the volume. Hence, volume and accuracy of alerts are very
consequential. As evidenced in the Evaluation of Tools sec-
tion (Section 4.5) the analysts’ time/tool efficiency and was
a primary driver for tool selection, but evaluation metrics
were often considered insignificant because correct results
and effectiveness of tools is the real goal. Another respon-
dent digressed,
[Our organization] has a standard risk level (low,
medium, high), and there is a protocol for each
level. Everyone is following rules, doing what
they are told to do to meet the letter of the law
for minimum-security standards. ... We don’t
have enough people who really understand this
stuff. “What products?” is inconsequential if the
users lack expertise. Instead [of building exper-
tise] we’ve bought commercial-off-the-shelf tools
to protect ourselves.
- Participant 2
We note that research of Sundaramurthy et al. [19] found
that the propensity for managerial decisions drove purchase
of security tools to be obtain best security practices, as op-
posed to efficiency, resulting in a contradictory position for
analysts, specifically use of the tool is orthogonal to SOC
workflows. Furthermore, Sundaramurthy et al. also found
that standard operating procedures can be problematic be-
cause the job necessarily requires creativity during investi-
gations. To quote an analyst from Sundaramurthy et al.’s
study,
The procedure were turning us into robots. The
procedures were so detailed at some point that
all the analysts were doing was to click and fill
in data.
Balancing SOC resources in terms of new tools, new pro-
cedures, flexibility versus structure, analyst man hours, and
analysts training is an inherent challenge, and trust in many
tools is suspect by the professionals.
Interactive Tools and Embedding Situational Expertise: Two
of the interview questions (addressing analyst challenges,
and controlling false positives/negatives) provided good in-
sight into how analysts interact with the tools. The discus-
sion above highlighted the need for actionable information
from the tools versus just the raw data, and identified a gap
in user understanding when working with singular events.
People desire to interact with the tools at a decision-making
level, where actions can be determined from higher-order
data correlations.
Based on the analyst responses, users are also forced to in-
teract at a very low-level when configuring the tools, not
just when they are trying to interpret events. Although not
explicitly expressed, a higher-order interaction when con-
figuring the tools can be inferred as a need, based on the
analyst descriptions of dealing with false positives and neg-
atives. In most cases, the respondents cited an iterative
tinkering with rules, indicators of compromise, or configu-
rations as the means to make their tools more effective in
their local environment. For example,
manual reconfiguration and tweaking rules, both
internally and from outside intel (new threat
info)
- Participant 11
Rules need to be as specific as possible, to reduce
possibility of false positives, saves analyst time.
Specificity can include tailoring signatures to the
organization, eg. by zone (dmz, etc.)
- Participant 4
initial strategy with <a vendor>: tune it and
continual reconfig
- Participant 2
These experiences highlight the need for a more interac-
tive and/or more automated means to tune the tools to the
nuances of the local network environment. Participant 12
explicitly described a need for automation in tuning rules.
However, automation implies an interaction with the tool
at a very high level. For example, the tool could provide a
means for analysts to enter feedback on the validity of an
alert, and have that feedback be the basis for automated tun-
ing. Although a non-trivial engineering task for a vendor,
this would allow local analysts to embed their domain exper-
tise and local experience into the tool. Not only would this
greatly simplify the tuning process and free analysts to focus
on discovering threats, it is a way to permanently capture
the human knowledge of the variation and customization of
a local network.
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Trending Tools: Building dashboards and visualizations
seemed an attractive and indeed used option by our respon-
dents, and not just for default, daily monitoring, but also
for infrequent projects such as visualizations of what net-
work and host data they collect to make new tool purchase
decisions, or visualizations for hunting threats in historical
data with new IOCs.
Discussions of dynamic capabilities, e.g., changing the quan-
tity or quality of data collected in certain situations, have
been adopted.
Traditional signature-based endpoint protection (AV) is
being replaced or supplemented by behavior or machine-
learning-based detectors. To quote an interviewee reported
by Botta et al. [4],
I would like a tool that could watch trends over
time...what’s normal patterns for our network,
what’s not normal patterns.
This pre-2007 desire seems to preempt the anomaly detec-
tion algorithms and AI-based AV that are becoming adopted
currently.
Given that storing 90 days of historical data is becoming
commonplace, we predict that large-scale analysis of data,
e.g., training a learning algorithm on all historic logs, are a
likely avenue for novel, network-specific technologies. Look-
ing even more into the future, cloud-based infrastructures
with remote desktops have the potential to replace current
infrastructure. For SOC operations this means an reversal of
position—instead of complete access to network-level data
and potentially limited host data access, host-level security
measures will dominate and network-level will be opaque.
Furthermore, costs of processing and moving data will be
charged per memory, storage byte, etc. Consequently, de-
veloping tools that integrate host-based data to pare-down
size but increase information-content will likely be an im-
portant avenue for future technologies.
6. CONCLUSION
Security operations now have widespread collection and
query capabilities for a diverse set of logs as well as config-
urable tools for meeting network-wide security requirements
(e.g., end-point encryption, email management, etc.). In or-
der to provide network protection, continual investigations,
log analysis, and tool configuration are commonplace for se-
curity analysts, but the ever-growing quantity of tasks and
data is proving problematic. As researchers seek to develop
useful security technologies, understanding the burden and
desires of the security operators is a necessity, but is hin-
dered by the the limited access of outsiders to SOC data,
problems, and operators. To this end, we conducted and
report results of a survey of security analysts that probes
their current practices, problems, and desires with respect
to host-based data collection, tools, and evaluation of tools.
Our results give details of quantity and types of data col-
lected, trending tools, evaluation procedures and metrics,
and perhaps most importantly desired capabilities and cur-
rent problems. Most notably, the analysts time is severely
constrained because the volume of alerts is high, the accu-
racy of alerts is suspect, and investigations are difficult and
time-consuming. Converting data into actionable informa-
tion requires expertise and manual integration of multiple
data sources, for which there is a great need to decrease
data volume, increase the data’s information content, and
increase the analysts. We hope that our findings can assist
future efforts to build worthwhile tools to enhance security.
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